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Abstract 
 
 
The United Nations Global Compact Initiative evolved from a challenge posed by 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan to business communities at the Davos World 
Economic Forum in January 1999.  “I call on you--individually through your firms, 
and collectively through your business associations--to embrace, support, and enact a 
set of core values in the areas of human rights, liberal standards, and environmental 
practices.”  Since that time, the Global Compact has emerged as a voluntary initiative 
where corporations are asked to embrace nine principles. 
 
As companies join the Global Compact, an independent outside analyst is invited to 
assess the incorporation of these principles into their daily operations.  The attached 
case, one of the first,  is a study of Novartis AG, a large Swiss pharmaceutical 
enterprise.  The report analyzes the inclusion of the Global Compact as an integral 
part of a strategy for sustainable corporate development.  Based on managerial 
interviews, the process of initiating a principles-based human rights dimension into 
managerial behavior is assessed. 
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NOVARTIS AND THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT INITIATIVE 
Lee A. Tavis 
 
The spirit of the Global Compact found fertile ground and has become an integral part of 
Novartis corporate strategy since the enterprise was formed by the merger of the two large Swiss 
pharmaceutical companies, Sandoz and Ciba, in 1996.  Following a four-year concentration on 
economic consolidation and performance, Daniel Vasella (Chairman and CEO) signed the 
Global Compact.  Together, productivity-based economic performance and a proactive approach 
to the expectations of society are envisioned as the key to long-term corporate success in the 
rapidly integrating global economic, political, and social environment of today’s large 
multinational corporation. 
 
This paper outlines the Novartis strategy and its implementation including the coalescing role of 
the Global Compact in the drive for sustainable corporate development.  Following a review of 
extending corporate strategy to incorporate social concerns into the economic business model,  
the process of implementing the strategy will be assessed.  In part three, specific examples of this 
strategic positioning will be outlined.
i 
 
 
1.  STRATEGIC POSITIONING 
 
1.1 Post Merger Economic Consolidation 
Ciba and Sandoz approached the merger into Novartis (“new skills” in Latin) as an operating 
response to the growing competition, concentration, and institutional buying structure in the 
globally integrating life science industry.  Both companies had roots in Basel dye production 
during the late 19
th century, and had entered the merger after what The Operational Review 
called, “their best year ever.”
ii   External observers, however, were less reassuring as to the past 
history of the two companies.  According to Forbes, “Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy were plodding, 
risk averse and assiduously Swiss firms that often got trounced by faster, fiercer U.S. rivals.  The 
research pipeline was dry, and marketers were slow on the draw.”
iii  On the other side, financial 
analysts embraced enthusiastically the formation of Novartis resulting from the largest industrial 
merger in history at that time, and forming the world’s largest life science company (healthcare, 
agribusiness, and nutrition) and the second largest pharmaceutical firm.  
 
The post merger period of intense performance-based consolidation included changes in the 
structure of the firm as well as its management system. 
 
·At the time of the merger Ciba’s Dyestuffs, Additives, and Plastics divisions were  
 spun off into a separate company, “Ciba Speciality Chemicals.”   
 
·Due to the lack of substantial synergies with other Novartis activities, Agriculture was 
 divested in 2000 and merged with the agricultural division of Astra-Zeneca to form the 
 Syngenta corporation.  At that time, the agribusiness operation was the largest in the 
 world.  It represented 28 percent of Novartis revenue and 24 percent of operating 
  i n c o m e .               
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·In 2000, Novartis shares were listed on the U.S. stock exchange as American Depository 
 Receipts, positioning Novartis as more attractive to U.S. investors. 
 
·Merger personnel redundancies were reduced largely through natural attrition and 
 early retirements.  Some employees started their own businesses with financial support 
 from the Novartis Venture Fund.  The first year following the merger, the workforce  
 was reduced by 9,199 at which point 62 percent of the anticipated merger cost synergies 
 and the targeted 12 percent workforce reduction were achieved.  At the same time,  
 2,400 new people with needed expertise were hired. 
 
·During the consolidation phase, a third of the 100 most senior managers joined Novartis 
 from other companies.  In the United States, of the top 13 executives in 1999, only two 
 remain. 
 
·Performance-based compensation was rigorously applied across the company with 
 total compensation targeting the fiftieth percentile of the compensation offered by a set  
 of comparable competitors.  Over 6,000 employees now receive share options as 
 part of their remuneration. 
 
·The pharmaceutical business was split into worldwide strategic business units 
 centered around therapeutic areas and customers with some of its global management 
 headquartered in the United States.   
 
·The Novartis presence in the U.S. market was dramatically increased--the sales force  
 growing from 3,100 to 4,600 in 1999 alone, probably the fastest expansion in pharma- 
 ceutical history.  Using direct-to-consumer advertising, upgrading sales training, and  
 accepting the risk of comparing their products with the best the industry has to offer 
 in clinical trials and post approval marketing, the Wall Street Journal credits Vasella 
 with “...transferring the firm into a bare-knuckled, American-style marketing 
 powerhouse.”
iv  
 
·The process of drug discovery and development was reorganized and revitalized to get  
 drugs to the market more quickly.  At the time of the merger, over half of drug sales   
 were from patent-expired products.  Development time has been shortened from 12 to 
 about 8 years, with a sharper market-oriented focus.  
    
·The financial performance (See Appendix A) reflects the synergistic value of the merger 
 and the emphasis on managerial performance.           
 
1.2 Strategic Expansion To Include Corporate Citizenship 
By 2000, with the consolidation process becoming secure, Vasella believed Novartis had 
achieved the economic freedom to be more encompassing in its response to societal claims on 
business enterprises.  In July, Novartis signed the United Nations Global Compact following a 
conversation between Kofi Annan and Daniel Vasella.  The Global Compact served an important 
coalescing role as Novartis moved to a sustainable long-term position in the market.  Urs 
Baerlocher, the senior executive for implementing the policy, describes the role of the Global William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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Compact, “The Global Compact, its principles and requirement to demonstrate credible action, 
triggered a discussion within Novartis on the nature of human rights, access to medicines, and 
the existing Code of Conduct, which led to our Corporate Citizenship Policy as an encompassing 
view of Novartis responsibility.”  According to Karin Schmitt (Head, Social Development, 
Novartis Foundation), “The Global Compact was an opportunity to show the Novartis 
commitment to human rights values, and the determination to live up to them realizing that we 
are inviting public scrutiny.”  
 
The generality of the Global Compact principles needed to be particularized for the specific 
Novartis environment as a first step in implementation.  The Corporate Citizenship Policy 
translates these principles to fit Novartis as a global pharmaceutical company.  During its year-
long preparation, Novartis planners sought the counsel of nongovernmental organizations such 
as the World Resources Institute, SustainAbility Ltd., and the Stakeholder Forum for Our 
Common Future (formerly UNED Forum).   
 
Introducing the Policy on Corporate Citizenship in October 2001, Vasella stated:   
“The Policy was developed in response to our commitment to the Global Compact, which 
was set forth by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan.  Across 
geographies and throughout our organization we will, in all our business, social, and 
environmental activities, strive to be in line with the principles of the Global Compact.  
We believe that adhering to values is especially important for large organizations in times 
of rapid change and globalization, as they provide guiding principles.  In our business, 
we are using innovative new technologies to search for novel lifesaving medical 
treatments. In some cases, these developments raise ethical challenges which must be 
carefullyconsidered with the establishment of proper boundaries, but Novartis’ ultimate 
goal is to contribute to helping patients in need.  
   
“On a global level, Novartis is committed to sustainable development and its three 
principles of economic, social, and environmental progress.  We want to be a leading 
corporate citizen, both technologically and economically, and achievement of that goal is 
closely linked to our ability to contribute to the benefit of people.  Our Policy on 
            Corporate Citizenship outlines our pledge, and it is both a strategic business initiative-- 
and the right thing to do.” 
 
 
At Novartis, corporate citizenship is not considered a socially responsive add-on.  It is intended 
to be an integral, necessary component of a successful pharmaceutical company.  Novartis is 
serious about this being a strategic business initiative.  Martin Batzer (Head, Pharma Affairs) 
describes this initiative in terms of a “license to operate.”  “It is the third concentric circle in a 
strategy of economic maximization for shareholders; attention to other stakeholders including 
associates (the Novartis term for employees), customers, and communities; and the third part of 
continuing attention to the permission of society for the right of the corporation to exist.  
Integrating these three circles and ensuring that the third (license to operate) feeds back into the 
other two is the key to sustainable corporate development in the long-term.  If you don’t have the 
license to operate, you can forget everything else.”  And, as noted by Terry Barnett (President 
and Chief Executive Officer, Novartis Corporation), “Right now, as a pharmaceutical company, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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that license seems to be up for renegotiation.  At issue is the appropriate role of the pharma- 
ceutical industry in the total healthcare environment.”  Baerlocher states, “If we want to be truly 
successful we need to achieve beyond products and services.  We also need our stakeholders to 
recognize that we are a valuable part of society, a good corporate citizen.”  Johannes Frey (Head, 
Corporate Affairs) notes, “Often the pursuit of corporate citizenship can have a direct payoff.  
You follow a risk management approach as we have refined it in our Health, Safety, and 
Environment Practices of incurring an expense now to minimize great damage down the road.  
Corporate citizenship is an investment.” 
 
2.  OPERATIONALIZING A STRATEGY OF CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP     
 
In its Policy on Corporate Citizenship, Novartis commits itself to the broad vision of human 
rights--the same base as the Global Compact principles.  “The Novartis core values are based on 
the fundamental rights of every individual, such as the protection of privacy, freedom of opinion 
and expression, freedom of association, nondiscrimination, and the right to be heard.  We seek to 
promote and protect the rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the 
United Nations within our sphere of influence.  We do not tolerate human rights abuses within 
our own business operations.” 
 
2.1 A Focus on Process          
This policy goes well beyond the political and civil rights that form the core of what are called 
the first generation of human rights to include second generation economic, social, and cultural 
rights.  In most business activities, it is the second generation rights that are to be promoted and 
protected “within our sphere of influence” and the abuses which will not be tolerated “within our  
own business operation.”  These second generation rights are far more difficult to specify; 
society is continually redefining its human rights concerns and acceptable thresholds; while 
national legislation supports these rights, they have received only modest recognition in the  
constitutions of modern Western cultures; they can easily become politicized; they can contradict 
one another; protecting second generation rights can be expensive. 
 
Given the continuing advance of societal expectations for the private sector, and based on a 
foundation of valuable experience in responding to environmental and social needs, Novartis is 
focusing on the process of achieving corporate citizenship.  The process begins with an 
articulation of one’s ultimate vision as quoted above supported by a strategy and a system that 
incrementally ratchet toward that vision through a steady process of setting, measuring, 
achieving, testing, and refining standards.  The idea is to establish a transparent process relating 
to those inside as well as outside the firm where objectives can be adapted as learning and 
measurements are refined.  There will be shortfalls as Norman Walker (Head, Human Resources) 
notes, “I can’t say we will meet all of our requirements today.  It’s a journey we have started 
with the purpose of seeing that our standards are achieved.”  In the final analysis, however, as 
Vasella states, “Don’t make commitments you can’t keep.”   
 
2.2 Valuable Experience 
In its implementation efforts, Novartis draws on a valuable history of involvement with civil 
society in its environmental and social response through its Health, Safety, and Environment 
(HSE) initiative and the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
 
  5
 
The HSE initiative began in the early technologically driven, production-focused ecological era 
of the 1980s.  Over time, HSE has become a part of line managerial responsibility analyzed 
annually in the context of local legal requirements, relative impact, competitive performance, 
and available state of the art technology.  Targets are set for each sector, performance measured 
(116 sites in 2001), externally verified and published in detail.  The development of this HSE 
process over the years has benefited substantially from dialogue with representatives from the 
other  components  of  civil  society.               
 
The HSE experience has helped Novartis find a balance between precaution and innovation in 
applying the “precautionary approach.”  This approach, more than any other clause of the Global 
Compact, has created hesitancy among firms in the United States.  The Global Compact is not 
specific in its seventh principle, asking firms to:  “Support a precautionary approach to environ- 
mental challenges.”  The principle is defined in the United Nations Rio Declaration: “Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”  
In applying the approach to human health as well as the environment, Novartis makes a distinc-
tion between prevention and precaution.  Prevention applies when there is a scientifically known 
cause and effect.  Prevention is an issue of cost.  Precaution applies when there is scientific 
uncertainty.  As Kaspar Eigenmann (Head, Corporate Health, Safety, and Environment) points 
out: “When the activity could lead to grave consequences, even if there is no full scientific proof, 
one should take reasonable measures.  The principle makes common sense.  It’s the application 
that creates controversy--how is the reasonable likelihood or the application of reasonable 
measures to be determined?”  The Novartis position states: “We take a precautionary approach in 
the innovation and development of new products and technologies.  To this end, we follow a 
step-by-step approach, we engage in scientific peer review, and we consider benefits and risks of 
innovation in a scientific and transparent manner,” a position initially “challenged” by the U.S. 
legal staff.  Alternatively, as Julie Kane (Vice President, Novartis Corporation) notes, “Lawyers 
are nervous, but their role is to advise about the risk so management can make the right 
decision.” 
 
The Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development concentrates on sustainable development 
in the poor regions of the world.  With the philosophy that “only autonomous development can 
constitute sustainable development,” social development projects are undertaken in partnership 
with local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs):  work with AIDS orphans in Northern 
Tanzania and South and East Africa, conflict management and the empowerment of women in 
Palestine, community development in Brazil and Sri Lanka, as well as leprosy cure and 
rehabilitation in partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO), National Health 
authorities, and NGOs.  Other activities include a social research and publication program, and 
stakeholder dialogue and networking.  Stakeholder dialogue is directed to “increase internal 
awareness of societal perceptions of development issues,” to “increase external awareness of 
business realities,” and to “keep in touch with societal expectations” through conferences, 
symposia, workshops, and membership in social committees and boards. 
 
The twenty years of experience with each of these initiatives has helped Novartis recognize the 
value of access to the information and worldviews of civil society.  There are many guiding William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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principles about how best to undertake the dialogue between management and representatives 
from other segments of civil society.  Two experiences as reflected in the interviews have been 
helpful in shaping Novartis policy.  Kaspar Eigenmann describes an interaction that began in the 
late 1980s.  At a casual dinner following a formal meeting on chemicals policy, a small group of 
participants from Ciba-Geigy and The Ecological Scientific Institutes in Vienna and Freiburg 
i.B. concluded that dialogue would be more productive than confrontation.  They initiated a 
series of small informal meetings often with neutral experts.  Initially, neither side told their 
colleagues about these discussions, since both assumed their colleagues would judge this kind of 
interaction inappropriate.  Over time, each side learned to appreciate the other’s logic.  Some 
discussion topics led to joint research and scientific publication, some only to more talk.  In all, 
around five projects emerged from this contact.  The periodic meetings continue with new 
younger people coming into the process.   A stakeholder experience related by Klaus Leisinger 
(Executive Director, Novartis Foundation) involved the importance of including the decision 
makers in the process.  In a joint corporate/NGO attempt to assess the consequences of Green 
Gene Technology, senior corporate and NGO management assigned the dialogic task to staff 
specialists.  In an effective dialogue over three years, the participants learned from each other in 
what Leisinger describes as a “discursive learning curve.”  They reached consensus on a series of  
recommendations, a consensus to which neither corporate nor NGO senior management would 
agree, since they had not participated in the learning curve and could not be convinced.   
 
Based on these kinds of experiences, the Novartis stakeholder policy states: “We provide 
relevant information and actively listen to stakeholders.  In assessing controversial products, 
processes and technology, we seek dialogue with all stakeholders.”  This policy extends the 
business model of listening to the market to the sustainable corporate model of listening to the 
signals from civil society.  As Andreas Seiter (Head, Stakeholder Relations) explains, “It’s 
important that we tell them, but even more important that they tell us.  When there is a 
developing issue which influences our future business strategy, we should be part of that debate, 
listening first before we make our point.”  The idea is to extract issues as they begin to form, 
long before they reach the media threshold, at which point the perceptions are set.  If initiated 
early, discussions are interesting for both sides, particularly when there is scientific evidence to 
share.  This window of discussion opportunity can last for up to six years. 
 
2.3 From Concept to Action 
While the idea of corporate citizenship is defined by headquarters as a component of long-term 
corporate sustainability, managers at the local levels, where the policy takes effect, face a 
plethora of immediate concerns and pressures toward short-term performance targets.  Dieter  
Wissler (Head, Corporate Communication) describes the challenge.  “The deeper you go into the 
organization, the greater the pressure on short-term results, and the less a person thinks about 
corporate social responsibility.  For local managers, corporate citizenship can be seen as a dictate 
from headquarters that drains energy from their operating focus.”  Complicating the distinction 
between headquarters and the field at Novartis are differences in the European and American 
views about the role of the Global Compact principles in corporate sustainability.  What is clear 
in the European perception is not as clear in the U.S. environment.   
 
Norman Walker sees corporate citizenship as a more difficult task than implementing the HSE 
Policy.  “It  poses a deep challenge to a company and the way it operates, it is much more about William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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our collective behavior.  This demands a specific attitude throughout the organization.” Erwin 
Schillinger (Head, International Coordination) makes a similar comparison to the Novartis Code 
of Conduct, initiated on a global basis two years before the Global Compact.  “The Global 
Compact added a whole new dimension.  While the Code addresses individual rights and 
responsibilities, the Global Compact is an obligation of the company with the necessity of 
bringing managerial decisions in line with its provisions.”   
 
A senior management Steering Committee was formed with the charge of making corporate 
citizenship an integral part of line management, including the information system, performance 
measurement, and incentives.  A campaign of awareness was initiated throughout the 
organization.  Following a series of corporate announcements, the Corporate Citizenship Policy 
was one-fourth of the program at the annual retreat of the top Novartis executives at Interlaken in 
February 2002, as well as sectoral and regional management meetings.  Discussions were 
initiated through the Novartis Intranet.   According to Walker, “You need to allow people to 
understand why you are pursuing these changes.  This is best accomplished by engaging people 
face-to-face in a young company like Novartis.  The enthusiasm for corporate citizenship as a 
strategic initiative has been a pleasant surprise.  We found that the purpose of the company is 
very important to our people, far more than just coming to the office day after day.  This is 
something they can relate to.”  Alternatively, “While our people in the United States are proud to 
have their company endorse the Principles, they are very much focused on the realities of the  
marketplace.  They are somewhat detached from the Principles and do not see their relevance as 
a U.S. issue” (Barnett). 
 
The next step was specific guidelines.  In structuring the guidelines, the Steering Committee 
prepared an inventory of policy commitments which relate to the underlying themes of the 
corporate citizenship strategy, how it unfolds into specific concerns to be addressed, and to their 
related policy commitments.  Further preparation involved the analysis of a wide range of United 
Nations documents and various codes of business conduct.  The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights provided the broad framework.  More specific 
guidance on qualitative and quantitative standards was drawn from the International Labor 
Organization conventions, recommendations, and declaration as well as other specific principles 
such as the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the U.N. Human 
Rights Sub-Commission Draft on Universal Human Rights Guidance for Companies, and the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  Consideration extended, for example, all the 
way to the possibility of credit schemes for microentrepreneurs in the supply chain.  Checklists 
for core indicators of minimum requirements and best practices were prepared.  In the end, 
however, there were surprisingly few specific standards in these documents.  
 
Four guidelines were issued in June 2002 with a fifth in formulation.  In preparation for a year, 
these guidelines were debated internally at all levels of the organization and circulated 
externally for comment.  Each addresses responsibilities, principles and standards, the 
management process, and the reporting criterion unique to the specific guideline. 
 
Guideline #1:  Management of Corporate Citizenship.  This initial guideline regulates the scope 
and applicability for those that follow.  It sets the structure for the “active management of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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corporate citizenship.”  The broad reach of the document addresses priority conflicts that might 
arise between corporate citizenship and short-term operating objectives that need to be 
arbitrated;  
a safe complaint procedure for employees who report corporate citizenship deficiencies; 
application of the principles to Novartis partners; reporting and audit procedures as well as the 
possibility of commissioning external auditors. 
 
Guideline #2:  Fair Working Conditions.  This guideline is directed to human resources,  
including the related aspects of human rights.  The creation of a reporting system is an important  
component of this guideline.  Before the Global Compact, working conditions were considered 
to be a local responsibility.   Early resistance to reporting was reminiscent of the early days of 
the HSE--Why do we have to do this?  What’s it really for? 
 
The third Global Compact principle was discussed at length in the preparation of this guideline.  
It asks world business “to uphold freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining.”  Jeff Benjamin (Vice President and Deputy General Counsel, Novartis 
Corporation) states, “Our existing policy is union neutral.  Our companies make sui generis 
decisions.”  While the language of the principle itself is not inflammatory, nor risky, legal staffs 
and managers of many companies, particularly in the United States, are concerned that the 
United Nations will interpret and measure the principle in ways that put pressure on firms to be 
pro union.   
 
The guideline clause on freedom of association recognizes the employee’s right to choose 
whether to join a trade union or employee association, but establishes criteria for these 
associations in terms of democratic principles, the existence of written statutes, a history of legal 
compliance, and that they be free and independent associations not committed to violence.  
Additional criteria may be established by local Novartis companies.  As in other Novartis 
policies, dialogue is included:   “Each Country Service Officer shall establish a communication 
process that ensures a free exchange of opinion [with associates] and a constructive dialogue.” 
 
The guideline on wages goes well beyond the Global Compact:  “In each market, full-time 
wages must be set at or above a level that covers the market price of a basket of goods and 
services representing the subsistence level for an average worker in the town or region in 
question.”  Dependent children are included in this “living wage.”  
 
Guideline #3:  Business Ethics – Bribes, Gifts, and Entertainment.  This guideline covers a topic 
not explicitly included as a principle in the Global Compact, drawing on the provisions of the 
Novartis Code of Conduct.  Governmental corruption, bribery, and marketing practices, along 
with access to medicines was identified by Novartis top management at the introduction of the 
Corporate Citizenship policy in Interlaken as the most important issues facing the industry.
v  
Batzer sees marketing practices as the toughest part in all of the guidelines, “How does one find 
the balance between competing in what has become a very aggressive market set against the 
exposure to the damage of what are viewed as unethical practices, with guidelines that hold 
across cultures and legal regimes?”  The Code of Conduct states, “No employee shall make any 
payment, or kickback, or offer improper financial advantage to an official of a government or a 
government-controlled entity for the purpose of obtaining business or other services, as set out in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.”  A true challenge, 
Christian Seiwald (Sector Head, Generics) said, “Corruption is a problem that all companies 
have to confront.  Solutions can only be home grown.”  There are undoubtedly cases out there, 
the task of Novartis is to change that behavior. 
 
Here, especially, senior management must convince everyone in the company of the seriousness 
of bribery.  Johannes Frey notes, “What headquarters would regard as a corrupting action can 
make sense to a local associate focusing on a specific business transaction in a lenient 
community who does not internalize the great risk to the company in an environment where the 
company needs to prove every day that it lives by its statements.”   
 
This guideline defines and prohibits bribing of government officials directly or through 
intermediaries.  It addresses the distinctions between, and provides guidance for, facilitating 
payments, gifts and entertainment, charitable donations and cultural contributions, political  
donations and contributions, and acceptable payments.  Local managers must explicitly report on 
their large transactions and consult with the relevant Corporate Citizenship Officer for any 
payments over $US 100.  Acts of private bribery are particularly difficult to assess due to the 
complex of codes, regulations, and contractual provisions that apply.   
 
Guideline #4:  Human Rights and Engagement in Society.  Focusing on the human rights issues 
that become the responsibility of Novartis, this guideline covers stakeholder engagement and 
government relations.  The policy recognizes that many human rights issues occur when local  
background institutions or governments are uninterested or not sufficiently empowered to protect 
human rights, and that Novartis has varying degrees of power to intervene.  The guideline directs 
a policy of governmental engagement.  “Relationships with governments and other public 
authorities need to be actively managed.”  But, “As a rule, local Novartis companies should be 
reluctant to get involved with political parties and take sides in election campaigns.”  Advocacy 
stances are acceptable if managed with care.   Aware of the increasing importance of the cultural,  
economic, and social dimensions of human rights, an amended version of this guideline will be 
issued in early 2003. 
 
Johannes Frey believes this will be the most difficult guideline to implement.  The margin of 
judgment is great, as can be the cost of making a mistake.  Managers must let governments and 
NGOs (groups with whom they tend to be uncomfortable) into their decisions with the attendant 
loss of control. 
 
Guideline #5 will concentrate on third party relationships.  The Novartis policy states, “We give 
priority to business partners, suppliers, and contractors who share our societal and environmental 
values, and we support their efforts to promote these values through their business activities.”  
The questions to be addressed in translating the policy to guidelines as outlined by Kaspar 
Eigenmann include, “How do we assess those who share our values; how is giving preference 
different from imposing specific standards; how does one balance how far to press one’s values 
on third parties and what legal liabilities are created; how does responsibility differ for  
subcontractors using Novartis technology, for suppliers where Novartis takes most of their 
output, or where national legal environments are weak?”  On a practical basis, where should 
initial efforts be concentrated--on the largest subcontractors in the most difficult countries? William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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The guidelines are in a continuing process of review and revision as experience is gained and 
measures refined.  Standards will be clarified as general principles are linked with concrete 
business activities. 
 
2.4 Establishing Credibility 
Implementing a long-term corporate citizenship strategy is a matter not only of actions but also 
of being perceived as doing a good job by internal and external stakeholders as well as by the 
broader society.  As an integral component of sustainable corporate development, corporate 
citizenship becomes a matter of pride for members of the Novartis organization, generates 
positive reputational effects among external stakeholders, and ensures continuation of the license 
to operate from the broader society.  Following the HSE and Foundation experience, it is 
intended that NGOs will have input into the process, measurements, and targets, as well as 
certification of the results. 
 
The active management of corporate citizenship means making it an integral part of Novartis line 
management and, to the extent possible, with third parties.  Each of the guidelines concludes 
with a section on “reporting criteria and measurement.”  The internal process of auditing 
compliance will follow the procedures of the financial and HSE audits.  Specific responsibilities 
have been created throughout the organization and assigned as collateral duties.  Novartis has 
concluded that making the compliance auditing responsibility a collateral duty at numerous 
levels throughout the organization is more effective in creating organizational change than fewer 
specialized personnel.  Most of these collateral duties are currently assigned to the human 
relations and legal staffs although Eigenmann would like to include more line managers.  With 
an initial emphasis on managerial processes and auditors serving in a consulting role, the 
auditing function will increasingly include performance as measures are refined and targets set--
following the HSE experience.  Understanding transparency as a necessary precondition for 
credibility, these assessments will be a component of the Novartis annual report following a 
process to be initiated in 2002.  At that time, the HSE data and verification which have been 
published in a separate Operational Review since 1996 will be included in that document.   
 
External monitoring is yet to be resolved.  It is accepted in principle and included in the 
guidelines but not yet operationalized.  As Leisinger notes, “Independent external verification 
plays an important role for the credibility of a company’s compliance effort--indeed, it is a 
precondition....  The search for consensus should therefore not focus on the question ‘Yes or No’ 
but on the ‘How.’”  As with all external monitoring systems there are questions of appropriate 
expertise, the process and its cost, the protection of proprietary information, the external 
monitor’s attitudes and organizational culture as well as their own credibility, and the public  
disclosure process and detail.  An unusual problem with NGOs as monitors outlined by Peter 
Tobler (Compliance Officer) is the breadth of the Policy set against the typically more narrow 
focus of the individual NGO.  An ideal external monitor is one with credibility who is willing to 
participate with Novartis as they both jointly work to improve a transparent process.  As 
successful as the HSE external auditing process has become, it is still a public verification of 
technical data collected and reported by Novartis.             
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Three examples of applying the principles of the Global Compact and Corporate Citizenship 
reflect where Novartis finds itself in the process at this time.  Two projects reflect the issue of 
access to medicine unique to the pharmaceutical industry.  The third example is common across 
industries, particularly those relying on subcontracted production in developing countries. 
 
3.1 Responsibility for Access to Drugs       
It is estimated that over one-third of the world’s population lacks access to essential health 
services, including drugs.  Limitation on access to treatment is a multifaceted issue involving the 
absence of medical services, unreliable health and supply systems, lack of sustainable financing, 
irrational selection and use of drugs, as well as the availability and price of drugs.   
 
Society is evolving to the conclusion that medical care is a human right, and that the pharma- 
ceutical industry has a unique responsibility to help sick people gain access to life saving 
medicines.  This is an extension of the Global Compact first Principle which asks world business 
to “support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights within their  
sphere of influence.”  In outlining the specific requirements associated with that principle, the 
U.N. directs business responsibility to an extension of the workplace ensuring the “rights to 
basic health, education, and housing (in areas where these are not provided).”  The 
pharmaceutical access to medicine programs reach well beyond the workplace and local 
communities to a broader “sphere of influence” embracing patients far beyond the traditional 
stakeholder boundaries.  This is a reflection of Dr. Vasella’s early experience in medical practice 
as well as that of other physicians in Novartis and the industry.  It also recognizes the view 
expressed by Vasella, “Unless the pharmaceutical industry achieves its objectives of being an 
accepted and valued player in society, we will be at a disadvantage in every new law and 
regulation that comes up.”   
 
Pharmaceutical companies are responding.  For developing countries, they are networking with 
civil society, governmental agencies, and components of the United Nations.   Novartis, for 
example, is part of the Global Alliance to Eliminate Leprosy.  The firm donates a multi-drug 
therapy which can cure the disease in six months or a year (depending on the disease form).  The 
drug has been available free of charge since 1995, and Novartis is committed to continue until 
leprosy has been eliminated.  Through the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development, in 
conjunction with governmental agencies, private foundations, the WHO, and the World Bank, 
the inadequacies of local health infrastructure as well as the fear and prejudice associated with 
leprosy are gradually being overcome.  Another partnership with the WHO is for the treatment of  
malaria.  In conjunction with the Chinese Academy of Military and Medical Science, Novartis 
discovered and developed the most potent anti-malarial for non-complicated Plasmodium 
falciparum.  In this agreement, Novartis is providing the drug at cost.  For Novartis employees 
and their nuclear families in developing countries, the firm is involved in the diagnosis, 
treatment, and care of HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria.  When not available through other sources, 
Novartis pays for the cost of assuring this coverage. 
 
Some pharmaceuticals are directly involved in finding treatments for diseases where there is no 
viable commercial market, thus posing a challenge to the wealth maximizing business model.  
Merck, for example, developed Mectizan to treat onchocerciasis (river blindness), a disease William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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which had devastated the populations of rich tropical river valleys for centuries.  Novartis is in 
the process of creating an Institute for Tropical Diseases in Singapore, which will concentrate on 
the discovery of treatments for these kinds of diseases.   
 
The new research approach of searching for molecular targeting therapies is expensive, thus 
driving treatment costs beyond the reach of many patients.  Here, broad patient assistance 
programs, such as the Novartis graduated assistance approach to its new drug, Gleevec, are 
coming into use.     
 
3.1.1 Research on Tropical Diseases: Example #1 
The Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases has recently been established in collaboration with 
the Singapore Economic Development Board.  The purpose of this research institute is to 
discover treatments for diseases of poverty, beginning with tuberculosis and dengue fever.  At 
the  
present time, less than 10 percent of the total pharmaceutical spending on research is directed 
toward tropical diseases which comprise 90 percent of the world’s health problems. 
 
The Global Compact was an important stimulus in the decision to emphasize drug discovery for 
tropical diseases.  Paul Herrling (Head, Research) noted, “Within Novartis, the Global Compact 
stimulated the discussion of access to medicines which led to the idea of a tropical disease 
laboratory and to Singapore.”  On a broader basis, the kind of awareness reflected in the Global 
Compact has brought shareholders from resistance, to acceptance, and now to preference for 
these kinds of contributions.  “Feedback at shareholder meetings about the Singapore project has 
been very positive.” 
 
Singapore is one of many collaborative efforts of Novartis.
vi  As a non-commercial effort, 
however, the open nature of its research environment will be unique.  Indeed, the intent of the 
Institute is to become a center for developing-country scientists, including a major training  
component.  Its initial focus on tuberculosis (a bacterial disease) and dengue fever (a viral  
infection from parasites) will be extended to other tropical diseases.  Its contribution will be in 
drug discovery, seeking other partners for the development of these drugs. 
 
More important than the financial commitment of $US 122 million is access to the Novartis 
laboratory management skills and experience in drug discovery.  Beyond that, Novartis will be 
contributing specific compounds that may have potential for the treatment of tropical diseases.   
“In the drug discovery process, it repeatedly occurs during searches for a specific therapeutic 
profile that medicines are found to have additional beneficial effects in other diseases.  One 
could imagine that while searching for drugs against the hepatitic C virus, something useful for 
dengue fever might be found, and vice versa.  This occurs because evolution uses similar 
biological mechanisms in different contexts” (Herrling).  Thus, a mechanism is being 
implemented to redirect compounds or small molecules that show potential for the treatment of 
tropical diseases from the Novartis commercial discovery laboratories to the Institute.  At the 
time of the interview, Herrling had two of these compounds on his desk for evaluation.  One 
compound in particular, while ineffective against cancer, had been identified as a possible 
treatment for parasitic tropical infections, given the nature of the compound and its history. 
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3.1.2 Ensuring Access to a Viable Commercial Drug: Example #2 
The second example involves an economically viable commercial drug.  A breakthrough in drug 
discovery, this treatment has demonstrated unprecedented efficacy in treating a relatively small 
population of cancer patients.  While it is expensive, Gleevec holds a virtual “efficacy and 
tolerability” monopoly in treating specific forms of leukemia and rare gastrointestinal tumors.  
The Novartis position is that all appropriate patients should not be denied access to the drug  
because of financial reasons.  As such, the company has initiated patient support programs 
globally.  
 
Gleevec is a young drug with stunning early success in treating chronic myelogenous leukemia 
(CML), a disease with a mortality rate near 25,000 yearly across the world.
vii  Paul Herrling 
describes Gleevec as “a new class of drugs based on understanding the pathway which leads 
from the gene to the disease and targeting the therapy to that specific abnormality.”  The results 
of the first clinical trials, begun in mid-1998 and initially reported in December 1999,
viii  “took 
the oncology-hematology community by storm.”  Of the 31 patients in this Phase I trial, all 
experi-enced a significant decrease in the number of cancerous white blood cells (symptomatic 
of the disease) while a third experienced very significant reduction or disappearance of cancer 
cells with the diseased chromosome.  Based on these early results, Novartis, in rapid fashion, 
began industrial-scale production in February 1999 (a complex process taking eight to nine 
months and requiring a dozen steps) and initiated its Phase II clinical trials.  Application for 
approval by the United States Food and Drug Administration was completed in March 2001, just 
32 months after the first human trials.  This compares to the typical drug development time of six 
years.  As David Epstein (President, Novartis Oncology) described the process, “We believe this 
is the fastest from first dose in man to filing.”   Approval (a process that can take anywhere from 
12 to 18 months normally) was granted in 72 days.  The product was at the wholesalers within 24  
hours of approval.  It is currently approved in most countries for treating certain forms of CML 
and now certain forms of gastrointestinal stromal tumors (GIST). 
 
Thanks to the internet, the news of Gleevec has spread rapidly across the world.  At a worldwide  
price of between $2,000 and $2,500 per month, most patients would not be able to pay for the 
drug without insurance or reimbursement through their country’s healthcare system.  Novartis 
management firmly believes a drug with such a dramatic potential should be available to all 
appropriate patients with CML.   At the same time, as a breakthrough drug, Gleevec must 
provide a profit in order to support additional investment not only in further study of it, but also 
for further research in oncology and other therapeutic areas.  The Novartis solution is to make 
Gleevec available worldwide through special assistance programs.   
 
A specific program was devised for the United States since the healthcare system is not a 
federally subsidized one as is the case in most other industrialized countries.  This is a graduated 
program with patient assistance offered at various levels based on income, assets, and household 
size--from receiving the drug free of charge if assets are below a certain amount and income less 
than $44,300 a year to paying a graduated portion of the total cost.  Assistance extends beyond 
five times the poverty level in some instances.  (Most donation programs are limited to less than 
two times the poverty level.)  The operation of this system in the United States is managed by a 
third party--Documedics--with specific expertise in reimbursement programs in oncology.  In the 
United States, Gleevec is covered by virtually all private insurance policies, although it is not William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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covered by Medicare since Medicare only covers injectables or physician administered drugs and 
Gleevec is an oral therapy.  Patients contact the Gleevec Reimbursement Hotline to see if they 
are eligible.  This is the program managed by Documedics, which then assesses the patient’s 
income, assets, and household status based on the information provided by the patients, assists in 
the search for alternative reimbursement sources and, if necessary, initiates the Patient 
Assistance Program.  Gleevec is then shipped directly to the patient.  The Gleevec Program is 
precedent-setting in the United States market.  Many pharmaceutical companies, including 
Novartis, have made drugs available to those who could not afford them, but no one else to date 
has published a graduated support system based on a patient’s ability to pay.  This program 
works due to the dependability of medical diagnosis, the assistance of the physician’s office staff 
and the Novartis sales force, access to Documedics, and the breadth and uniformity of private 
healthcare coverage. 
 
A different kind of program is operational outside the United States--the Glivec international 
Patient Assistance Program (GIPAP).  This is not an additional reimbursement program but 
rather a donation program that follows specific criteria.  Outside the United States, the nature of 
the healthcare systems and the quality of infrastructures varies dramatically.  In many countries, 
the government healthcare system subsidizes pharmaceuticals.  However, a large number of 
countries do not have health insurance--private or government.  For these countries, Novartis has 
initiated the GIPAP Program.  Through GIPAP, Glivec is made available in countries where it is 
approved for treating certain forms of CML and GIST.  Qualified patients are those who are 
properly diagnosed, not insured, not reimbursed, and have no other financial recourse (unable to 
pay privately). 
 
In order to ensure that appropriate patients are considered for this drug therapy, applications for 
GIPAP assistance must be initiated by physicians on behalf of their patients.  The physician must 
be involved in all stages of the treatment (diagnosis, prescription, and follow-through).  This 
regulation is in accordance with the World Health Organization (WHO), who provides global 
guidance on essential drugs and medicines, and works with individual countries on implementa- 
tion of national drug policies. 
 
The Max Foundation, an international nonprofit organization dedicated to people with leukemia 
and other blood-related diseases, administers GIPAP (applications are available via the Internet, 
www.themaxfoundation.org).   Most communication with the Max Foundation is through the 
Internet.  The creativity of this approach is the reliance on the physician and the use of the 
Internet as the systemic vehicle.  Together, these minimize the distributional infra-structure.    
 
Thus, both Gleevec, as a young drug, and its distribution systems are works in progress. 
 
3.2 Ensuring the Rights of Workers: Example #3 
An early step in implementing the Global Compact was a baseline survey undertaken by the 
Steering Committee to assess issues relative to compliance with the principles and to identify 
areas of sensitivity to human rights abuses where Novartis operations could be vulnerable.  Of 
particular concern were third-party activities.   
 
While Novartis has no legal liability for the stakeholders of subcontracting firms, it was William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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determined that this is a component of the human rights policy as indicated in the Global 
Compact and since the well being of subcontractor stakeholders is affected by the activities of  
Novartis.  This is particularly true when the stakeholders do not have adequate local background 
institutions to represent their interests.  In Western Europe and the United States, society has 
decided that these third-party stakeholders are the responsibility of the multinational, a view 
which can conflict with those of the developing world.   
 
This third example arose from the baseline vulnerability assessment based on the Global 
Compact Principle six:  “to uphold the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment 
and occupation.”  In addition, the second Principle asks world business “to make sure they are 
not complicit in human rights abuses.”  The initial vulnerability questionnaire identified two 
examples.  To the surprise of management, one was in Basel where a janitorial contracting firm  
was paying less than the community standard.  Another example was the existence of pregnancy 
testing at a subcontracting production facility in a developing country free trade zone.  The 
management of the plant was pregnancy testing job applicants during a preemployment physical  
without the applicant’s knowledge, and denying employment to pregnant women.  Before the 
Global Compact emphasis on human rights, pregnancy testing had never surfaced as a part of 
Novartis’ anti-discrimination policy. 
 
As with most human rights issues, there were a number of complicating factors:  The production 
facility was owned and managed by the local government, as was the whole free trade zone; 
undisclosed pregnancy testing was not against the law; it was the policy across the free trade 
zone where a condition of employment was that the worker be unmarried and not pregnant.  The  
senior plant management believed they were making an important contribution to the applicant 
by providing a physical examination--perhaps the first in her life.  It was argued, since most of 
these applicants were migrant workers from distant, remote villages, they should know about 
their pregnancy in time to return home for the birth and for the nurturing environment of the 
extended family--an environment that could not be replicated at the plant site.  The management  
of the plant and that of the free trade zone were convinced their policy was the best for the 
applicant, for the free trade zone, and for their society. 
 
The counter argument, based on the dignity of the applicant, was that pregnancy is such a central 
and unique component of a woman’s identity, even though others may treat the issue with great 
respect, the woman herself should decide whether to reveal her pregnancy and determine what 
would be best for herself and her child.   
 
Pregnancy testing can be viewed both as a form of sex discrimination and a violation of a 
woman’s right to privacy.  While sex discrimination is prohibited by ILO convention, it does not 
explicitly address pregnancy testing.  The United Nations Human Rights Committee has called 
on States to include the right to privacy in their legal codes, although few have.   
 
Denying employment on the basis of pregnancy can, in many countries, pit local practice against 
global hypernorms.  Is this an area where global society should, and has the right, to overrule  
local practice?   Local Novartis management argued that pregnancy testing was an accepted 
practice in the country as directly represented by the government-owned facility and 
management of the zone, insisting that a change would jeopardize the relationship with the plant William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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that had demonstrated acceptable overall standards for labor practices over an extended period of 
time and was a model plant for its environment (as confirmed by an on-site monitoring visit).  
Beyond the pregnancy testing issue, insisting on a change of policy could have a negative effect 
across a broad range of other interactions between Novartis and the government. 
 
This issue found its way to the Novartis Executive Committee, consisting of the top eight 
executives in the company.  The Committee with Vasella, as chairman, judged that the practice 
was, indeed, discriminatory and would be immediately stopped.  The current policy is that 
pregnancy testing is offered cost-free as part of the application physical, but is not a condition of 
employment. 
 
4.    PRESENT  STATUS         
 
In a pharmaceutical company, long-term performance depends upon the success of research and 
development as well as the marketing of useful and safe pharmaceutical products, plus the 
managerial acumen to achieve the financial results needed to sustain that research and develop- 
ment.  For Novartis, the spirit of the Global Compact becomes a strategic component of  
sustainable corporate development as it is interwoven with the business model and cuts across 
the economic, social, and environmental aspects of decision making.  These principles, 
particularized in the Corporate Citizenship Policy, help the firm meet the expectations of society 
so critical for its long-term development.  Implementation depends upon the ability to 
continually refine the process of measuring, setting, and achieving targets for the human rights 
dimension of Novartis and third-party operations within an overall vision; the capability of line 
management to integrate corporate citizenship into the economic business model, and to settle 
tensions between competing objectives as they arise; the credibility of the process as perceived 
by internal and external stakeholders as well as the broader society. 
 
Novartis is midstride in bringing its strategy of long-term corporate sustainability to fruition.  
Top management has operationalized the principles of the global Compact as evidenced by the 
above examples reflecting the uniqueness of the pharmaceutical discovery and distribution of 
drugs, and as a multinational subcontracting its production to third parties.  These outcomes are 
measurable in terms of drugs discovered, patients served, and rights protected.  Still, these are 
senior management initiatives.  The goal of integrating Corporate Citizenship into the mindset of 
the operating manager remains a work in process.  The question is whether the process of 
implementation and compliance is up to the challenge.  It promises to be a more daunting task 
than either the Health, Safety, and Environment success or the Code of Conduct.   
 
The vision is clear as is the determination of senior management.  The publication of guidelines 
in June 2002 initiated the system of standards and accountability, a system that appears capable 
of evolving toward fulfilling the vision.  Credibility is an open question.  Internal credibility will 
grow with the implementation process.  Based on experience, Novartis management is convinced 
their policy of early, open dialogue with external stakeholders will lead to better decisions and to 
credibility. Verification will be part of the social as well as the environmental process.  Formal,  
external monitoring has yet to be introduced.  This is a continuing process.  As Vasella notes, 
“The policy incorporates our aspirations--recognizing that we still have some areas where we do 
not yet live up to the policy.”William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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Appendix A 
 
Novartis AG 
Performance Data 
   
 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
Financial Performance
 (a)   
Revenues (CHF billion) 20.0 23.1 23.2  25.2 29.1 32.0  
Research and Development (CHF billion) 3.1 3.7 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.2  
 
Overall Operating Margins
(b) 18.8% 21.8% 24.8% 25.1% 23.1% 22.7%  
 
Pharmaceutical Operating Margins 24.6%
(c) 27.9%
(c) 31.0% 30.6% 29.8% 28.1%  
                  Industry
(d) 30.2% 28.5% 29.1%  36.3% 27.9% 24.1%  
 
Return on Equity
(e) 16.7% 20.7% 20.7%  19.4% 17.6% 17.8%  
                  Industry
(d) 27.3% 24.5% 32.8%  29.2% 30.2% 23.4%  
 
Business Sectors
 (a)   
Pharmaceuticals 58.0% 61.0% 62.5%
(b) 60.6% 62.3% 63.0%  
Generics 6.0% 6.3% 6.6%  7.2% 6.8% 7.6%  
Consumer Health  26.0%
(d) 22.7%
(d) 20.5% 22.1% 22.4% 20.8%  
CIBA Vision  6.0% 6.1% 6.5%  6.4% 4.8% 5.6%  
Animal Health  4.0% 3.9% 3.9%  3.7% 3.7% 3.0%  
 
Financial Market Assessment   
Price/Earnings Ratios   
         Novartis Hi  na 34.0 31.0   31.5 26.3 28.6  
         Novartis Lo  na 19.6 22.4  21.0 17.5 19.9  
         Industry
(d) Hi  27.4 44.8 50.9  42.9 39.4 na  
         Industry
(d) Lo  19.8 28.3 32.8  30.3 24.3 na  
Market/Book Ratios   
         Novartis  3.8 6.6 6.4  4.4 6.1 4.3  
         Industry
(d)   7.0 15.5 22.6  16.2 18.1 na
 
Footnotes 
a.  Agriculture is not included because it was divested in 2000.             
b.  Operating Income/Sales. 
c.  Healthcare operating margins 
d.  Standard & Poor’s Analysts’ Handbook. 
e.  Novartis financial leverage is substantially below the average for the industry.  For Novartis, Debt/Total Assets 
     averaged 5.8% from 1996-2000, compared to an industry average of  9.5%. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 526 
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Delivering on Its Commitment to the Global Compact,” July 2002.  (Unpublished case study.) 
vi.  Of the over US$ 2 billion budgeted annually for research and development, about one-third is 
allocated to collaboration with other research centers.  This share, in the upper range for 
pharmaceutical companies, is deemed necessary in order to keep the 300 scientists at Novartis in 
close contact with the many drug discovery networks of interest to the firm.  The importance of 
discovery networks is underscored in the 38-year history of the Novartis drug Gleevec summarized 
in the next section. 
vii.  The official name of the drug is Gleevec in the United States and Glivec in the rest of the world. 
 Before April 2001, it was referred to as STI571, a term still in use. 
viii.  B.J. Druker, Presentation at the 41
st Annual Meeting of the American Society of Hematology, 
December 3-7, 1999, New Orleans  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 1/10/03 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 530: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
Gender Voice and Correlations with Peace 
Morehead Dworkin and Cindy A. 
Schipani 
Jan. 2003 
No. 529: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“The Organizational Model for Workplace Security” 
Dr. Thomas K. Capozzoli  Jan. 2003 
No. 528: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
”Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism in Property, Liberty, and Corporate 
Governance” 
O. Lee Reed  Jan. 2003 
No. 527: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, “On 
Virtue and Peace: Creating a Workplace Where People Can Flourish” 
Caryn L. Beck-Dudley and 
Steven H. Hanks 
Jan. 2003 
No. 526: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Novartis and the United Nations Global Compact Initiative” 
Lee A. Tavis  Dec. 2002 
No. 525: Why Transition Paths Differ: Russian and Chinese Enterprise 
Performance Compared 
Sumon Bhaumik and Saul Estrin  Jan. 2003 
No. 524: Official Regulations and the Shadow Economy: A Labour 
Market Approach 
Maxim Bouev  Dec. 2002 
No. 523: Children at Risk: Infant and Child Health in Central Asia  Cynthia Buckley  Jan. 2003 
No. 522: Wages and International Rent Sharing in Multinational Firms  John W. Budd, Jozef Konings and 
Matthew J. Slaughter 
July 2002 
No. 521: Gross Job Flows in Ukraine: Size, Ownership and Trade 
Effects 
Jozef Konings, Olga Kupets and 
Hartmut Lehmann 
Dec. 2002 
No. 520: Entrepreneurial Networking in China and Russia: Comparative 
Analysis and Implications for Western Executives 
Bat Batjargal  Dec. 2002 
No. 519: Agriculture and Income Distribution in Rural Vietnam under 
Economic Reforms: A Tale of Two Regions 
Dwayne Benjamin and Loren 
Brandt 
Mar. 2002 
No. 518: Property Rights, Labour Markets, and Efficiency in a 
Transition Economy: The Case of Rural China 
Dwayne Benjamin and Loren 
Brandt 
Mar. 2002 
No. 517: Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies: Ideology, 
Information or Incentives? 
Loren Brandt and Hongbin Li  Oct. 2002 
No. 516: Ex-ante Evaluation of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: 
The Case of Bolsa Escola 
François Bourguignon, Francisco 
H. G. Ferreira and Phillippe G. 
Leite 
Sep. 2002 
No. 515: Missed Expectations: The Argentine Convertibility  Sebastian Galiani, Daniel  
Heymann and Mariano Tommasi 
Nov. 2002 
No. 514: Job Reallocation and Productivity Growth under Alternative 
Economic Systems and Policies: Evidence from the Soviet Transition 
J. David Brown and John S. Earle  Nov. 2002 
No. 513: Cross-Border Trading as a Mechanism for Capital Flight: 
ADRs and the Argentine Crisis 
Sebastian Auguste, Kathryn M.E. 
Dominguez, Herman Kamil and 
Linda L. Tesar 
Nov. 2002 
No. 512: Embracing the Market: Entry into Self-Employment in 
Transitional China, 1978 -1996 
Xiaogang Wu  Sep. 2002 
No. 511: Opening the Capital Account of Transition Economies: How 
Much and How Fast 
Daniel Daianu and Radu 
Vranceanu 
Sep. 2002 
No. 510: Bridging “the Great Divide”: Countering Financial Repression 
in Transition 
Patrick Conway  May 2002 
No. 509: Change the Regime – Change the Money: Bulgarian 
Banknotes, 1885-2001 
Adrian E. Tschoegl  May 2002 
No. 508: Differential Rewards to, and Contributions of, Education in 
Urban China’s Segmented Labor Markets 
Margaret Maurer-Fazio and Ngan 
Dinh 
June 2002 
No. 507: Balassa-Samuelson Effect in Transition Economies: The Case 
of Slovenia 
Boštjan Jazbec  Oct. 2002 
No. 506: Explaining Gender Differences in Unemployment with Micro 
Data on Flows in Post-Communist Economies 
Jana Stefanová Lauerová and 
Katherine Terrell 
Sep. 2002 
No. 505: Bank Performance in Transition Economies  Steven Fries, Damien Neven and 
Paul Seabright 
Sep. 2002 
 